In His Father’s Long Shadow : Hun Manet’s First Year as Cambodian Prime Minister
After the parliamentary elections in summer 2023, Cambodia’s long-term ruler Hun Sen handed over the reins of office to his eldest son Hun Manet. After one year, it is hardly surprising that Hun Sen remains Cambodia’s most powerful man.
Children who follow in the footsteps of their prominent parents often don’t have it easy. Usually, they are measured and judged by the success of their parents, be it in sport or art. This is not always fair. In a family business it can be particularly problematic when the junior takes the helm, but senior refuses to let go. It’s not much different in Cambodia at the moment. Over the last three decades, the way in which political power has been exercised has gradually changed. Starting from a party dictatorship of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the country first transformed into a classic one-person autocracy and then into a family business. It is no longer Hun Sen alone who holds the reins firmly in his hands with his close followers – the importance of his children has gradually increased, and the Hun clan is preparing to develop a dominance in Cambodia that Southeast Asia has not experienced since the time of Suharto in Indonesia.
Government formation as an expression of maximum corruption and nepotism
Hun Manet (46) is the figurehead of the family’s generational transition. In August 2023, he took over as prime minister from his father, who had been in charge since 1985. The approval in parliament, to which 120 of the 125 CPP MPs belong following the exclusion of the only relevant opposition party from the elections, was a purely formal act. Similarly, other long-serving ministers passed the baton on to their sons (and one daughter) last year, sometimes in the same portfolio, creating quasi-dynastic hereditary courts comparable to those of Cambodia’s aristocratic era. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of secretaries and undersecretaries of state by 122% to an astronomical 1,422 people in less than 30 ministries represented the latest blow-off in a country already plagued by corruption and nepotism.
These personnel decisions are revealing. Obviously, the pacification of the country still depends fundamentally on the regime’s ability to feed as many followers as possible through the state. Precisely because the construct appears so fragile, its virtuoso creator will not let go of it so quickly: Hun Sen is not only indispensable in the self-image, but also remains the personal guarantor of a political order in which, according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2024, state institutions have been almost completely undermined by patronage and informal networks. Whether Hun Manet can ever succeed him in this respect is more than questionable.
While the Senate becomes a secondary office, the country is sinking into debt
Since April, in addition to his office as party leader, to which he was elected for life in 2015, Hun Sen has become president of the senate, making him the de facto deputy head of state. As he can interpret this role quite freely, he has turned the Senate into a secondary foreign ministry and welcomes Cambodia’s highest state guests there or, as happened in June 2024, CIA Director William Burns. In addition, Hun Sen remains the central veto player in all policy areas that should actually be subject to the new prime minister’s right to shape policy. But in this role, Hun Manet remains even less visible than originally expected. In his first year in office, he has not taken any political initiative that could be associated with his name or that would have left a lasting impression – not to mention far-reaching reforms. While his father had at least formulated narratives of his reign with the myth of the liberation from the Khmer Rouge on January 7, 1979 (Prampi Makara) and later with the so-called Win-Win Policy, his son has so far failed to convey a more modern narrative of the undemocratic unity of state and party.
This could yet take its toll. As one of the fastest growing economies in the world before the pandemic, prosperity increased noticeably for most Cambodians. This boosted legitimacy and compensated to some extent for the lack of democratic participation. However, there are increasing signs that the party could be over. While private debt was still at USD 3.3 billion and 28% of gross domestic product in 2011, six years later it was already USD 19.2 billion and 87% of GDP, before climbing to USD 53.1 billion and 180% of GDP by 2022. It is unclear whether and, if so, how long this steep rise, which is unique throughout East and Southeast Asia, can continue. Due to the completely unregulated microfinance sector, private over-indebtedness has already become a general social phenomenon. However, the government perceives no need for action, such as the introduction of a private insolvency law or other stabilizing measures. Instead, the regime continues to pin its hopes on international investors, especially Chinese real estate speculators, to pump even more money into the country.
Systematic human rights violations continue
Probably to prevent the economic imbalance from leading to widespread political dissatisfaction, the regime is once again increasing its use of repression and making deterrent examples of opposition activists and dissidents. As recently as July 2024, ten environmental activists were sentenced to prison terms of between six and eight years. The Candlelight Party, the only relevant opposition party, also remains in the regime’s crosshairs. Anyone who, like leaders Sam Rainsy and Mu Sochua years ago, did not flee abroad or switch sides before the last elections is living dangerously. In July 2024, the Cambodian human rights organization LICADHO counted at least 59 political prisoners, including the well-known opposition politician Kem Sokha. He is currently serving his 27-year prison sentence for alleged treason, which was imposed in March 2023, under house arrest. Other prominent supporters of the opposition prefer the alternative of submitting to the regime; Hun Sen himself has called this systematic strategy of punishment against all actual and potential critics of the regime “Isolate and Finish”.
Obvious criminals, on the other hand, often get away scot-free. Cambodia is no longer just a paradise for money launderers from all over the world, but has also become an international center for organized online fraud. The US State Department estimates that more than 12 billion US dollars (almost 40% of GDP) are generated annually. The largest player Huione Guarantee alone, as part of the Huione Group, apparently earned around USD 11 billion between 2021 and mid-2024, mainly from online fraud and money laundering. Obviously, these activities do not only take place with the extensive connivance of the Cambodian government, but can also be directly linked to the Hun clan. A key basis of these mafia activities is human trafficking and kidnapping; its victims are forced into fraudulent activities. A particular group of victims of the Chinese gangs are their own countrymen, which has already led to express disapproval of Cambodian laissez-faire in Beijing.
But the bilateral, partly neo-colonial partnership is otherwise intact. As satellite images show, at least two Chinese ships, including the corvette Wenshan, have been permanently stationed at the Cambodian naval base Ream since December 2023. As a result, Beijing has finally realized the desire it has cherished since the 1960s to gain military access to the Gulf of Thailand. However, the permanent stationing of foreign troops is a violation of the Cambodian constitution and is therefore denied by the Cambodian government despite overwhelming evidence.
Cambodia’s alliance with China complicates security cooperation in ASEAN
However, the foreign policy implications are likely to be even more serious, as Cambodia is violating or at least ignoring the security interests of neighboring countries. Above all, relations with Vietnam, Cambodia’s occupying force from 1979 to 1989, have visibly deteriorated and are an example of how unfortunate Prime Minister Hun Manet has been in office. In addition to the increasingly close military relations between Cambodia and China, the construction of a waterway linking Phnom Penh with its own coast in the south, which is due to begin in the fourth quarter of 2024, is also causing further disgruntlement in Vietnam. Firstly, it is unclear how the infrastructure project known as the Funan Techo Canal will change the water level in the Mekong Delta and thus affect agriculture there. Secondly, security concerns have also arisen, as the canal, which is financed and operated by China, could be used by the Chinese navy causing that Vietnam would suddenly be accessible to them from the land side via the connection to the Mekong when it is completed in 2028.
However, the Cambodian government apparently does not consider any necessity to allay Vietnamese concerns. On the contrary, the comprehensive feasibility study on which the canal is based has not yet been published in order to provide clarity. Other opportunities for talks, particularly during Hun Manet’s inaugural visit in December 2023, have also apparently not been used to ensure understanding and transparency in the neighborly relationship. Once again, Cambodia is showing that its relationship with the People’s Republic of China is so important that it can even affect relations with its regional neighbors if necessary. And this in turn does not bode well for further security policy cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
As shown, Hun Manet has no shortage of tasks, challenges and problems to overcome. The only question is how long he will wait to tackle them forcefully or whether he even has enough political capital of his own to take them on. He doesn’t have much time left, because the worst thing that could happen to him is being perceived as a lame duck as long as his father defines Cambodia’s political guidelines. And Hun Sen’s claim to power is clearly far from extinguished.
