The Myth of Authoritarian Efficiency

Novi Sad, a railway station and a railway line in Serbia’s second-largest city—an infrastructure project publicly staged during the 2022 election campaign by Aleksandar Vučić together with Viktor Orbán, ceremonially inaugurated in July 2024. A prestige project intended to symbolize progress—modernization of infrastructure, state efficiency, and political decisiveness.

Just four months later, the concrete canopy above the station entrance collapses. People die. Deficiencies become visible; indications emerge of incomplete and faulty inspections, use without full authorization, inadequate maintenance, as well as shortcomings in planning and execution. Subsequent investigations, indictments, and court decisions proceed slowly; among other things, there are partial discontinuations of proceedings and later blockages. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office is now investigating possible misuse of EU funds, and the Serbian public prosecutor is investigating corruption allegations related to the station’s renovation.

Behind this stands a political system closely tied to President Vučić’s power. His government presents itself externally as capable of making decisions and efficient: large-scale projects are implemented quickly, made visible, and politically marketed. Internally, the system is characterized by patronage, corruption, lack of transparency, weak oversight, and politicized institutions.

The collapse thus represents not merely an isolated failure, but reveals a pattern that extends far beyond Serbia. A narrative that primarily stages efficiency rather than ensuring it sustainably. Upon closer examination, the supposed efficiency of autocratic systems proves to be less an empirical reality than a political myth, one that is increasingly unraveling in concrete cases such as Novi Sad.

The Crisis of Democracy

Empirical studies have shown for decades that a stable majority worldwide fundamentally considers democracy the best form of government. At the same time, many citizens express considerable dissatisfaction with how democratic systems function in practice. From a normative perspective, democracy therefore does not face a fundamental legitimacy problem, but rather a growing gap between the democratic ideal and its actual implementation.

The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index BTI shows that the quality of democratic institutions has declined in many countries over recent decades. Blockages between government and parliament, difficult coalition formations, conflict-prone coalitions, and lengthy decision-making processes can both impose real constraints on political capacity to act and create the impression of such constraints. In the context of the BTI’s diagnosis of stagnating economic development alongside rising public debt, social inequality and economic exclusion intensify. Austerity measures are usually first felt through cuts to social services as well as reduced investment in education and research. Environmental and sustainability policies are often pushed to the margins of political priorities. At the same time, the quality of public services and infrastructure is deteriorating in many countries. When social groups develop a lasting sense of being disadvantaged, political polarization increases.

Moreover, the current global polycrisis reinforces the desire for security and for simple and rapid solutions. In this context, politics is often overwhelmed, particularly when national governments face international problems. At the same time, many states are losing reliable international partners due to rising nationalism and protectionism – partners with whom such challenges could previously at least be addressed multilaterally. In such contexts, promises of alternative forms of politics gain appeal, even when they contain authoritarian elements.

Autocratic Narratives – Real Deficits and Distorted Perceptions

The growing gap between democratic aspiration and democratic practice thus creates an entry point for actors seeking to delegitimize the existing system. This rarely occurs through outright rejection, but mostly in the name of a supposedly “better” democracy. Populist criticism draws on real weaknesses but contrasts them with the image of a more efficient, more decisive form of politics. The dominant narrative is that of a faster democracy oriented toward an undefined “will of the people,” which delivers better outcomes without the constraints imposed by institutional checks on government power.

The suppression or defamation of opposition, media criticism, or protests makes government policy appear far less conflict-ridden. By definition, such a government cannot make mistakes. The arduous negotiation processes of a pluralistic liberal democracy, the forging of broad societal compromises, and the public contestation over the best solution are, by contrast, reinterpreted as chaos and a lack of decisiveness. Autocracies, on the other hand, can simply suppress opposition, media criticism, and protests, thereby appearing less prone to error and inefficiency.

This impression is reinforced by selective references to seemingly successful autocratic examples. Often, only authoritarian systems such as Singapore, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are cited, while the failure of many authoritarian regimes such as North Korea is far less frequently used as a benchmark. Even in (former) democracies that have embraced governing without accountability along autocratic lines, such as Hungary, Turkey, or indeed Serbia, structural problems become evident that in the long term exacerbate precisely those deficits they claim to resolve. As the Novi Sad example shows, the erosion of democratic institutions and the dismantling of civil rights do not lead to governance oriented toward the common good—quite the opposite.

From Narrative to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The autocratic narrative often marks the beginning of “a typical sequence of populist-authoritarian dismantling of democratic institutions.’’ Once such actors come to power through elections, they initially focus their attention on institutional checks and balances. This includes, for example, increased use of emergency provisions, the appointment of politically loyal judges, constitutional changes to extend terms of office, and the systematic defamation and suppression of political opposition. Particularly in consolidated democracies, these institutions represent the most effective obstacles to authoritarian power expansion.

Once these checks are weakened, restrictions on fundamental political participation rights usually follow. The aim is to marginalize or eliminate civil society organizations, media, and protest movements. This is reflected, among other things, in increasingly unfair electoral conditions and in restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, expression, and the press.

There are numerous examples worldwide. In addition to recent developments in Benin, Georgia, and Serbia, which must now be classified as autocracies for the first time in a long period, more drastic examples can be seen in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in El Salvador under Nayib Bukele, and in Hungary under Viktor Orbán.

Fact Check: Autocratic Efficiency

The findings of BTI 2026 refute the narrative of the superiority of authoritarian systems. Compared to stable democracies, autocracies as well as backsliding democracies perform significantly worse in both governance and economic development. A central reason for this is that in autocratic regimes, the preservation of power takes precedence over policies oriented toward the common good. This undermines both the quality of governance and economic performance. For example, short-term, highly visible infrastructure projects are often prioritized, but they are not designed for sustainability. The BTI thus shows that the supposed speed advantage of authoritarian systems only rarely leads to better outcomes.

Good governance is achieved through open political processes, pluralistic debates, and the inclusion of societal actors. While a highly centralized, hierarchical system of governance may offer short-term coordination advantages by avoiding political deadlock or lengthy negotiations, decision-making concentrated within a narrow circle of elites, combined with limited public debate, criticism, and oversight, reduces learning and adaptability, and ultimately the quality of policy solutions. Democracies have structural advantages here, as they incorporate diverse societal perspectives into decision-making processes and must negotiate compromises even under difficult coalition conditions, which tends to produce more robust and sustainable solutions. In contrast, many autocracies are characterized by opaque and corruption-prone patronage systems that waste resources and prevent accountability.

The priorities of self-enrichment and power preservation are also directly reflected in economic structures. Compared to democracies, autocracies exhibit significant deficits in the development of comprehensive welfare systems, particularly in healthcare, old-age security, and protection against illness or unemployment. While some autocracies do have relatively well-developed welfare systems, these are often marked by structural inequalities. Autocracies tend to focus more strongly on serving particularistic interests, which is reflected in economic inefficiency, deliberately unequal economic systems, and selective social policies.

This logic of selective inclusion extends to other areas of social participation. In access to education, public office, and employment, women as well as ethnic, religious, and other societal groups face significantly greater structural disadvantages than in democracies. This is particularly evident in “successful” autocracies such as Singapore and the Gulf monarchies, where migrant workers are scarcely integrated into welfare systems. The efficiency successes of individual autocracies should therefore not obscure the structural deficits of authoritarian systems as a whole.

Making Democratic Performance Visible

The juxtaposition of supposedly efficient autocracy and often perceived sluggish democracy is based less on empirical evidence than on powerful political narratives. The structural deficits of authoritarian systems lie precisely in the areas where they claim superiority: quality of decision-making, sustainability, and orientation toward the common good. By contrast, corruption, lack of accountability, and low adaptability are systemic features of autocratic governance.

That the authoritarian narrative can have devastating consequences is evident not only in Novi Sad, but also in the early and controversial presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2024, in which President Aleksandar Vučić once again prevailed over the opposition. Vučić has used a narrative of stability and decisiveness to place himself in a position where political failure scarcely leads to a loss of power. The continued success of such governments thus reflects less their performance than the power of the underlying narratives.

Against this backdrop, the central features of democratic politics—open conflict, complex decision-making procedures, and institutional checks and balances—appear in a different light: democracy is not despite, but precisely because of these characteristics, a prerequisite for learning capacity, correction, and long-term stability. A credible democratic narrative can only emerge if democratic systems address their own deficits: “The honest analysis of one’s own weaknesses should be the subject of negotiation processes among democrats themselves and should not become the presumed domain of radical populists.’’ Confronting authoritarian narratives is thus inseparably linked to the practical quality of democratic governance. Whether democratic systems can prevail will ultimately be determined by their ability to deliver visible and resilient solutions to the challenges of the present.

This article was first published by Bertelsmann Stiftung.