Road to Transitional Justice in Syria: A Fragmented State Surrounded by War
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, Syria’s transitional authorities have presented accountability and transitional justice as central pillars of political reconstruction. Yet meaningful transitional justice cannot emerge in a fragmented state exposed to institutional weakness, political exclusion, and regional conflict. With a weak interim government, a highly diverse populace and a new war at its borders, can transitional justice remain a government priority?
Transitional justice in times of crises
Transitional justice is the combination of activities conducted to deal with the legacy of past violence to address collective trauma and reconstruct political legitimacy. These activities are criminal prosecutions, judicial investigations of human rights violations, truth commissions, reparations programmes, transformation of the military, judiciary and state institutions. In post-conflict societies, transitional justice is not only about punishing perpetrators, but also about rebuilding trust between citizens and state institutions.
To rebuild the state, Syria must face its past. After 14 years of civil war with multiple parties to the conflict, crimes of the past must be reconciled to build social cohesion as well as legitimate and functioning state institutions. Having suffered from the state violence for more than a decade, fostering trust between citizens and the state is indispensable to build legitimate institutions and to promote the rule of law in the country. Social cohesion is especially important in Syria as parties to the conflict came from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. Trust must be built horizontally among the people and vertically between the people and the state. Transitional justice efforts aim to achieve exactly that.
Syria has been going through an interesting past 17 months after the flee of Bashar Al-Assad. Nowadays, Syria has been trying to rebuild itself in the aftermath of 14 years of human rights violations of a brutal regime. Effective steps in the direction of transitional justice have been taken, but sustainable accountability cannot emerge while the state remains fragmented and exposed to regional conflict.
Syria’s interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa has framed transitional justice and accountability as priorities of the transitional government. In March 2025 the Constitutional Declaration provided the founding of a “Commission for Transitional Justice”. This was followed by the establishment of the National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ) with the Presidential Decree No.:20, mandated to investigate human rights violations across the country.
The first concrete step in this direction has been implemented on Sunday 26 April 2026 with the first hearing in the trial of ousted ruler Bashar al-Assad. The hearing marked the opening of the transitional justice process aimed at addressing crimes committed during the civil war. While Assad and his brother were being tried in absentia, former security official Atif Najib, a cousin of Assad, appeared in court in person.
The transitional government’s efforts to instate transitional justice face three important challenges: the credibility of the National Commission and its limited scope of justice, weak state institutions, and a new war creeping up at the borders. President Al-Sharaa appointed Abdulbaset Abdullatif as the head of the National Commission for Transitional Justice. He previously led a pro-democracy political organisation, recognised by several UN and EU member states, to coalesce the opposition groups against Bashar al-Assad’s government.
Selective Justice
The transitional government and the National Commission have received substantial criticism over the limited scope of their justice and accountability efforts which have largely overlooked both the multiplicity of perpetrators involved in the conflict and the voices of the victims themselves. Human Rights Watch identified the Commission as a “missed opportunity for victim-led justice” because of its limited mandate. A joint statement released by Syrian civil society organisations stipulate that the National Commission’s vision and mandate don’t adequately address the legacy of atrocities and violations of the past.
As it stands, the commission has limited its scope to the crimes committed by Assad’s government, excluding crimes committed by non-state actors throughout the conflict. Reports by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) as well as the findings of international and local human rights organizations consistently reported that various de facto authorities in the country, some jihadist groups, notably the Islamic State (ISIS), in addition to foreign military forces were implicated in the violations committed during the civil war. The reappointment of individuals implicated in violations to official positions also undermines the whole procedure.
Rather than a broad and national process, the transitional government adopted a top-down approach of convicting the crimes of the former government. This is reflected in the legal and constitutional frameworks established under the name of transitional justice.
Although the former regime is responsible for the majority of crimes, it should not shift attention from the crimes of other actors involved in the conflict. This exclusion not only compromises the legitimacy and the comprehensiveness of the process in its entirety, but it also weaponizes the transitional justice efforts as a mechanism to legitimise the transitional government in contrast to the previous one. This selective political justice process is conducive to fostering feelings of injustice and exclusion of the victims who suffered from abuses by non-state actors involved in the conflict.
Problems in Political Representation
Political pluralism and inclusive representation are indispensable to create able and accepted institutions which will foster transition towards democracy and support the processes of transitional justice. Effective accountability mechanisms require credible courts, independent judges, functioning investigative bodies, and public trust in the rule of law. However, Syria’s transitional government is fragmented, with compromised representation, and is currently under pressure due to the US-Israel-Iran conflict.
The first parliamentary elections after the flee of Bashar Al-Assad were held on 5 October 2025. Although they promised a lot of hope, the elections were deemed to be a “missed opportunity.” With a presidential decree, the President retained the direct power of appointing one-third of the parliament and the indirect authority to select the candidates who would be able to run for a parliamentary seat. This resulted in a deep misrepresentation in the parliament, giving the majority of the seats to Sunni Muslims. Although the Sunni Muslims make up the ethnic majority of the country, the seats allocated to minority groups such as Christians, Kurds, and Alawites were not representative of the population. This imbalance in political representation threatens the efforts to instate a democratic governance.
The presidential decree no. 143 of 2025 created a legislature largely under the power of the executive giving the President the power to appoint one-third of the parliamentarians and selecting the members of the High Electoral Committee, a body that elects the remaining candidates of the Parliament and oversees the elections. Additionally, the Decree’s provisions on candidacy allows for the disqualification of candidates under broad definitions such as “a supporter of the former regime” or “advocating for separation, division, or reliance on foreign powers.” The vague provisions allowing the disqualification of candidates hurt the political independence of the parliament.
According to the Transformation Index BTI, Syria has seen the largest increase in political transformation out of all 137 countries, increasing by over 1 point from 1.7 in 2024 to 2.8 in 2026. However, in comparison, Syria remains a hard-line autocracy. The separation of powers has decreased from 2 to 1 out of 10 points between 2024 and 2026 due to the suspension of the 2012 constitution by the al-Sharaa government. Meanwhile, the association and assembly rights indicator increased from 1 in 2024 to 7 in 2026, marking a significant increase in representation and activity for civil society groups. Although there is some progress in representation compared to the previous regime, political institutions must reflect the composition of the public, especially in the post-conflict stage.
A New War at the Borders
Although Syria has so far avoided direct involvement in the US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the regional escalation increasingly threatens the fragile political and institutional foundations of Syria’s transition towards democracy. Transitional justice processes depend on institutional stability and accountability, economic development, and political cohesion, all of which remain vulnerable to renewed regional conflict.
As it stands, the impact of the US-Israeli war with Iran on Syria has been limited. President Al-Sharaa stated that Syria will stay out of the conflict, unless directly attacked by a party to the conflict. However, regional instability can threaten and destabilise transitional justice efforts and Syria’s fragile recovery.
As a reaction to Israel’s occupation of southern Syria and the bombing of Damascus which resulted in Syrian military casualties, the government has avoided direct involvement in the conflict. In the aftermath of Israeli bombings in Lebanon, Al-Sharaa sent Syrian forces to reinforce the Lebanese border to prevent a military escalation and a potential border crossing of Hezbollah fighters into Syria. He also supported the Lebanese government’s efforts to disband Hezbollah, signalling to Israel that Syria does not pose a threat.
Another source of instability lies in eastern Syria, where increased activity by the Iran-backed militias in Iraq potentially threatens the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army. This fragmentation could potentially create new opportunities for an ISIS resurgence. All of this could create further sectarian fractures in the Syrian society, further hindering the post-civil war efforts of social cohesion.
Even without direct fighting, the war is beginning to strain Syria’s fragile economic development. Al-Sharaa’s recovery strategy depends on a stable region that encourages investment and economic integration. This could include sustained regional cooperation, functioning cross-border trade and investment corridors, and minimum political to enable long-term economic development. However, the current instability threatens energy supplies, trade routes, and regional connectivity. In such conditions, the financial and institutional resources required for meaningful transitional justice risk becoming secondary to immediate security and economic concerns.
Conclusion
How Syria addresses the crimes of the past will test its commitment to justice and rule of law and will determine whether it can achieve long-term stability and democracy. Transitional justice in Syria cannot succeed as an isolated legal process. It requires inclusive political representation, institutional reconstruction, and relative regional stability. Without these foundations, accountability risks becoming selective, politicised, and incapable of producing genuine reconciliation. Syria’s biggest challenge now is to prosecute the crimes of the past without reproducing them with the politics of the present.
